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Otherwise you just get ‘expected string `Derive(['’ which isn't very helpful.
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If a derivation has multiple outputs, then we only want to download
those outputs that are actuallty needed. So if we do "nix-build -A
openssl.man", then only the "man" output should be downloaded.
Likewise if another package depends on ${openssl.man}.
The tricky part is that different derivations can depend on different
outputs of a given derivation, so we may need to restart the
corresponding derivation goal if that happens.
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For example, given a derivation with outputs "out", "man" and "bin":
$ nix-build -A pkg
produces ./result pointing to the "out" output;
$ nix-build -A pkg.man
produces ./result-man pointing to the "man" output;
$ nix-build -A pkg.all
produces ./result, ./result-man and ./result-bin;
$ nix-build -A pkg.all -A pkg2
produces ./result, ./result-man, ./result-bin and ./result-2.
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This allows repairing corrupted derivations and other source files.
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"config.h" must be included first, because otherwise the compiler
might not see the right value of _FILE_OFFSET_BITS. We've had this
before; see 705868a8a96a10f70e629433cfffc2d5cd2703eb. In this case,
GCC would compute a different address for ‘settings.useSubstitutes’ in
misc.cc because of the off_t in ‘settings’.
Reverts 3854fc9b42d16b810f62b64194b699033b03aaf1.
http://hydra.nixos.org/build/3016700
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This should also fix:
nix-instantiate: ./../boost/shared_ptr.hpp:254: T* boost::shared_ptr<T>::operator->() const [with T = nix::StoreAPI]: Assertion `px != 0' failed.
which was caused by hashDerivationModulo() calling the ‘store’
object (during store upgrades) before openStore() assigned it.
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derivations added to the store by clients have "correct" output
paths (meaning that the output paths are computed by hashing the
derivation according to a certain algorithm). This means that a
malicious user could craft a special .drv file to build *any*
desired path in the store with any desired contents (so long as the
path doesn't already exist). Then the attacker just needs to wait
for a victim to come along and install the compromised path.
For instance, if Alice (the attacker) knows that the latest Firefox
derivation in Nixpkgs produces the path
/nix/store/1a5nyfd4ajxbyy97r1fslhgrv70gj8a7-firefox-5.0.1
then (provided this path doesn't already exist) she can craft a .drv
file that creates that path (i.e., has it as one of its outputs),
add it to the store using "nix-store --add", and build it with
"nix-store -r". So the fake .drv could write a Trojan to the
Firefox path. Then, if user Bob (the victim) comes along and does
$ nix-env -i firefox
$ firefox
he executes the Trojan injected by Alice.
The fix is to have the Nix daemon verify that derivation outputs are
correct (in addValidPath()). This required some refactoring to move
the hash computation code to libstore.
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--enable-shared.
* In libutil/libstore/libexpr etc., link against sqlite and aterm.
* Some more header file hygiene.
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tag used in naming 'struct _ATerm'".
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* Optimise header file usage a bit.
* Compile the parser as C++.
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promise :-) This allows derivations to specify on *what* output
paths of input derivations they are dependent. This helps to
prevent unnecessary downloads. For instance, a build might be
dependent on the `devel' and `lib' outputs of some library
component, but not the `docs' output.
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`derivations.cc', etc.
* Store the SHA-256 content hash of store paths in the database after
they have been built/added. This is so that we can check whether
the store has been messed with (a la `rpm --verify').
* When registering path validity, verify that the closure property
holds.
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