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Only indirect roots (symlinks to symlinks to the Nix store) are now
supported.
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That is, delete almost nothing (it will still remove unused links from
/nix/store/.links).
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Put all Nix configuration flags in a Settings object.
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We can't open a SQLite database if the disk is full. Since this
prevents the garbage collector from running when it's most needed, we
reserve some dummy space that we can free just before doing a garbage
collection. This actually revives some old code from the Berkeley DB
days.
Fixes #27.
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We don't need this anymore now that current filesystems support more
than 32,000 files in a directory.
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‘nix-store --export’.
* Add a Perl module that provides the functionality of
‘nix-copy-closure --to’. This is used by build-remote.pl so it no
longer needs to start a separate nix-copy-closure process. Also, it
uses the Perl API to do the export, so it doesn't need to start a
separate nix-store process either. As a result, nix-copy-closure
and build-remote.pl should no longer fail on very large closures due
to an "Argument list too long" error. (Note that having very many
dependencies in a single derivation can still fail because the
environment can become too large. Can't be helped though.)
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derivations added to the store by clients have "correct" output
paths (meaning that the output paths are computed by hashing the
derivation according to a certain algorithm). This means that a
malicious user could craft a special .drv file to build *any*
desired path in the store with any desired contents (so long as the
path doesn't already exist). Then the attacker just needs to wait
for a victim to come along and install the compromised path.
For instance, if Alice (the attacker) knows that the latest Firefox
derivation in Nixpkgs produces the path
/nix/store/1a5nyfd4ajxbyy97r1fslhgrv70gj8a7-firefox-5.0.1
then (provided this path doesn't already exist) she can craft a .drv
file that creates that path (i.e., has it as one of its outputs),
add it to the store using "nix-store --add", and build it with
"nix-store -r". So the fake .drv could write a Trojan to the
Firefox path. Then, if user Bob (the victim) comes along and does
$ nix-env -i firefox
$ firefox
he executes the Trojan injected by Alice.
The fix is to have the Nix daemon verify that derivation outputs are
correct (in addValidPath()). This required some refactoring to move
the hash computation code to libstore.
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size of the NAR serialisation of the path, i.e., `nix-store --dump
PATH'). This is useful for Hydra.
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with the same name as the output) and instead use the
DerivationOutputs table in the database, which is the correct way to
to do things.
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is enabled by not depending on the deriver.
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(Linux) machines no longer maintain the atime because it's too
expensive, and on the machines where --use-atime is useful (like the
buildfarm), reading the atimes on the entire Nix store takes way too
much time to make it practical.
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18446744073709551615ULL breaks on GCC 3.3.6 (`integer constant is
too large for "long" type').
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SHA-256 outputs of fixed-output derivations. I.e. they now produce
the same store path:
$ nix-store --add x
/nix/store/j2fq9qxvvxgqymvpszhs773ncci45xsj-x
$ nix-store --add-fixed --recursive sha256 x
/nix/store/j2fq9qxvvxgqymvpszhs773ncci45xsj-x
the latter being the same as the path that a derivation
derivation {
name = "x";
outputHashAlgo = "sha256";
outputHashMode = "recursive";
outputHash = "...";
...
};
produces.
This does change the output path for such fixed-output derivations.
Fortunately they are quite rare. The most common use is fetchsvn
calls with SHA-256 hashes. (There are a handful of those is
Nixpkgs, mostly unstable development packages.)
* Documented the computation of store paths (in store-api.cc).
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accessed time of paths that may be deleted. Anything more recently
used won't be deleted. The time is specified in time_t,
e.g. seconds since 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC; use `date +%s' to
convert to time_t from the command line.
Example: to delete everything that hasn't been used in the last two
months:
$ nix-store --gc -v --max-atime $(date +%s -d "2 months ago")
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order of ascending last access time. This is useful in conjunction
with --max-freed or --max-links to prefer deleting non-recently used
garbage, which is good (especially in the build farm) since garbage
may become live again.
The code could easily be modified to accept other criteria for
ordering garbage by changing the comparison operator used by the
priority queue in collectGarbage().
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again. (After the previous substituter mechanism refactoring I
didn't update the code that obtains the references of substitutable
paths.) This required some refactoring: the substituter programs
are now kept running and receive/respond to info requests via
stdin/stdout.
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bytes have been freed, `--max-links' to stop when the Nix store
directory has fewer than N hard links (the latter being important
for very large Nix stores on filesystems with a 32000 subdirectories
limit).
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https://svn.nixos.org/repos/nix/nix/branches/no-bdb).
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* nix-store --register-validity: option to supply the content hash of
each path.
* Removed compatibility with Nix <= 0.7 stores.
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$ nix-env -e $(which firefox)
or
$ nix-env -e /nix/store/nywzlygrkfcgz7dfmhm5xixlx1l0m60v-pan-0.132
* nix-env -i: if an argument contains a slash anywhere, treat it as a
path and follow it through symlinks into the Nix store. This allows
things like
$ nix-build -A firefox
$ nix-env -i ./result
* nix-env -q/-i/-e: don't complain when the `*' selector doesn't match
anything. In particular, `nix-env -q \*' doesn't fail anymore on an
empty profile.
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need any info on substitutable paths, we just call the substituters
(such as download-using-manifests.pl) directly. This means that
it's no longer necessary for nix-pull to register substitutes or for
nix-channel to clear them, which makes those operations much faster
(NIX-95). Also, we don't have to worry about keeping nix-pull
manifests (in /nix/var/nix/manifests) and the database in sync with
each other.
The downside is that there is some overhead in calling an external
program to get the substitutes info. For instance, "nix-env -qas"
takes a bit longer.
Abolishing the substitutes table also makes the logic in
local-store.cc simpler, as we don't need to store info for invalid
paths. On the downside, you cannot do things like "nix-store -qR"
on a substitutable but invalid path (but nobody did that anyway).
* Never catch interrupts (the Interrupted exception).
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computing the store path (NIX-77). This is an important security
property in multi-user Nix stores.
Note that this changes the store paths of derivations (since the
derivation aterms are added using addTextToStore), but not most
outputs (unless they use builtins.toFile).
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from a source directory. All files for which a predicate function
returns true are copied to the store. Typical example is to leave
out the .svn directory:
stdenv.mkDerivation {
...
src = builtins.filterSource
(path: baseNameOf (toString path) != ".svn")
./source-dir;
# as opposed to
# src = ./source-dir;
}
This is important because the .svn directory influences the hash in
a rather unpredictable and variable way.
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* addToStore now adds unconditionally, it doesn't use readOnlyMode.
Read-only operation is up to the caller (who can call
computeStorePathForPath).
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* addToStore() and friends: don't do a round-trip to the worker if
we're only interested in the path (i.e., in read-only mode).
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* Added new operation hasSubstitutes(), which is more efficient than
querySubstitutes().size() > 0.
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mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user.
The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so
the caller can be completely unprivileged.
This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since
the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on.
Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user
files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure
store operations.
Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off
a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket.
That would be even more secure.
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containing functions that operate on the Nix store. One
implementation is LocalStore, which operates on the Nix store
directly. The next step, to enable secure multi-user Nix, is to
create a different implementation RemoteStore that talks to a
privileged daemon process that uses LocalStore to perform the actual
operations.
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