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Fixes #2969.
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(cherry picked from commit c38c726eb5d447c7e9d894d57cd05ac46c173ddd)
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cpptoml now parses almost all examples from the spec.
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Turns out we were mis-parsing single-quoted attributes, e.g. 'key2'.
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See:
https://github.com/NixOS/nix/commit/7becb1bf1c2ec1544a5374580a97b36273506baf#r33450554
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For text files it is possible to do it like so:
`builtins.hashString "sha256" (builtins.readFile /tmp/a)`
but that doesn't work for binary files.
With builtins.hashFile any kind of file can be conveniently hashed.
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this is added for completeness' sake since all the other possible
`builtins.typeOf` results have a corresponding `builtins.is<Type>`
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the nix-store --init command is a noop apparently
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A partner of builtins.getContext, useful for the same reasons.
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This can be very helpful when debugging, as well as enabling complex
black magic like surgically removing a single dependency from a
string's context.
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SRI hashes (https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/) combine the hash algorithm and
a base-64 hash. This allows more concise and standard hash
specifications. For example, instead of
import <nix/fetchurl.nl> {
url = https://nixos.org/releases/nix/nix-2.1.3/nix-2.1.3.tar.xz;
sha256 = "5d22dad058d5c800d65a115f919da22938c50dd6ba98c5e3a183172d149840a4";
};
you can write
import <nix/fetchurl.nl> {
url = https://nixos.org/releases/nix/nix-2.1.3/nix-2.1.3.tar.xz;
hash = "sha256-XSLa0FjVyADWWhFfkZ2iKTjFDda6mMXjoYMXLRSYQKQ=";
};
In fixed-output derivations, the outputHashAlgo is no longer mandatory
if outputHash specifies the hash (either as an SRI or in the old
"<type>:<hash>" format).
'nix hash-{file,path}' now print hashes in SRI format by default. I
also reverted them to use SHA-256 by default because that's what we're
using most of the time in Nixpkgs.
Suggested by @zimbatm.
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Closes #179.
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stdenv relies on this. So ignore self-references (but only in legacy non-structured attributes mode).
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In structured-attributes derivations, you can now specify per-output
checks such as:
outputChecks."out" = {
# The closure of 'out' must not be larger than 256 MiB.
maxClosureSize = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
# It must not refer to C compiler or to the 'dev' output.
disallowedRequisites = [ stdenv.cc "dev" ];
};
outputChecks."dev" = {
# The 'dev' output must not be larger than 128 KiB.
maxSize = 128 * 1024;
};
Also fixed a bug in allowedRequisites that caused it to ignore
self-references.
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Fix overflow when verifying signatures of content addressable paths
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For example, this prevents a "kvm" build on machines that don't have
KVM.
Fixes #2012.
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Fixes #2361.
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The current usage technically works by putting multiple different
repos in to the same git directory. However, it is very slow as
Git tries very hard to find common commits between the two
repositories. If the two repositories are large (like Nixpkgs and
another long-running project,) it is maddeningly slow.
This change busts the cache for existing deployments, but users
will be promptly repaid in per-repository performance.
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Fix symlink leak in restricted eval mode
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In EvalState::checkSourcePath, the path is checked against the list of
allowed paths first and later it's checked again *after* resolving
symlinks.
The resolving of the symlinks is done via canonPath, which also strips
out "../" and "./". However after the canonicalisation the error message
pointing out that the path is not allowed prints the symlink target in
the error message.
Even if we'd suppress the message, symlink targets could still be leaked
if the symlink target doesn't exist (in this case the error is thrown in
canonPath).
So instead, we now do canonPath() without symlink resolving first before
even checking against the list of allowed paths and then later do the
symlink resolving and checking the allowed paths again.
The first call to canonPath() should get rid of all the "../" and "./",
so in theory the only way to leak a symlink if the attacker is able to
put a symlink in one of the paths allowed by restricted evaluation mode.
For the latter I don't think this is part of the threat model, because
if the attacker can write to that path, the attack vector is even
larger.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
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Includes documentation and test.
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This is primarily useful for processing Cargo.lock files.
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Issue https://github.com/NixOS/nix/issues/2165
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Allow global config settings to be defined in multiple Config
classes. For example, this means that libutil can have settings and
evaluator settings can be moved out of libstore. The Config classes
are registered in a new GlobalConfig class to which config files
etc. are applied.
Relevant to https://github.com/NixOS/nix/issues/2009 in that it
removes the need for ad hoc handling of useCaseHack, which was the
underlying cause of that issue.
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Fixes #1374.
Closes #2129.
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Nix prints the floating point number 4.0 as "4".
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git://github.com/ryantrinkle/nix
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