From 3a4bd320c2c4043a4b1f73406030e9afc0677b59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eelco Dolstra Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 11:52:57 +0100 Subject: Revert "Merge branch 'seccomp' of https://github.com/aszlig/nix" This reverts commit 9f3f2e21edb17dbcd674539dff96efb6cceca10c, reversing changes made to 47f587700d646f5b03a42f2fa57c28875a31efbe. --- src/libstore/build.cc | 94 ++++++++++++++++----------------------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/libstore/build.cc') diff --git a/src/libstore/build.cc b/src/libstore/build.cc index f702433a0..c970fbdca 100644 --- a/src/libstore/build.cc +++ b/src/libstore/build.cc @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #define pivot_root(new_root, put_old) (syscall(SYS_pivot_root, new_root, put_old)) #endif @@ -815,6 +814,9 @@ private: result. */ ValidPathInfos prevInfos; + const uid_t sandboxUid = 1000; + const gid_t sandboxGid = 100; + public: DerivationGoal(const Path & drvPath, const StringSet & wantedOutputs, Worker & worker, BuildMode buildMode = bmNormal); @@ -1642,56 +1644,8 @@ void chmod_(const Path & path, mode_t mode) } -#if __linux__ - -#define FORCE_SUCCESS(syscall) \ - if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(0), SCMP_SYS(syscall), 0) != 0) { \ - seccomp_release(ctx); \ - throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule for " #syscall); \ - } - -void setupSeccomp(void) { - scmp_filter_ctx ctx; - - if ((ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW)) == NULL) - throw SysError("unable to initialize seccomp mode 2"); - -#if defined(__x86_64__) - if (seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_X86) != 0) { - seccomp_release(ctx); - throw SysError("unable to add 32bit seccomp architecture"); - } -#endif - - FORCE_SUCCESS(chown32); - FORCE_SUCCESS(fchown32); - FORCE_SUCCESS(lchown32); - - FORCE_SUCCESS(chown); - FORCE_SUCCESS(fchown); - FORCE_SUCCESS(fchownat); - FORCE_SUCCESS(lchown); - - FORCE_SUCCESS(setxattr); - FORCE_SUCCESS(lsetxattr); - FORCE_SUCCESS(fsetxattr); - - if (seccomp_load(ctx) != 0) { - seccomp_release(ctx); - throw SysError("unable to load seccomp BPF program"); - } - - seccomp_release(ctx); -} - -#undef FORCE_SUCCESS - -#endif - - int childEntry(void * arg) { - setupSeccomp(); ((DerivationGoal *) arg)->runChild(); return 1; } @@ -2011,14 +1965,18 @@ void DerivationGoal::startBuilder() createDirs(chrootRootDir + "/etc"); writeFile(chrootRootDir + "/etc/passwd", - "root:x:0:0:Nix build user:/:/noshell\n" - "nobody:x:65534:65534:Nobody:/:/noshell\n"); + (format( + "root:x:0:0:Nix build user:/:/noshell\n" + "nixbld:x:%1%:%2%:Nix build user:/:/noshell\n" + "nobody:x:65534:65534:Nobody:/:/noshell\n") % sandboxUid % sandboxGid).str()); /* Declare the build user's group so that programs get a consistent view of the system (e.g., "id -gn"). */ writeFile(chrootRootDir + "/etc/group", - "root:x:0:\n" - "nobody:x:65534:\n"); + (format( + "root:x:0:\n" + "nixbld:!:%1%:\n" + "nogroup:x:65534:\n") % sandboxGid).str()); /* Create /etc/hosts with localhost entry. */ if (!fixedOutput) @@ -2202,7 +2160,12 @@ void DerivationGoal::startBuilder() Pid helper = startProcess([&]() { /* Drop additional groups here because we can't do it - after we've created the new user namespace. */ + after we've created the new user namespace. FIXME: + this means that if we're not root in the parent + namespace, we can't drop additional groups; they will + be mapped to nogroup in the child namespace. There does + not seem to be a workaround for this. (But who can tell + from reading user_namespaces(7)?)*/ if (getuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, 0) == -1) throw SysError("setgroups failed"); @@ -2235,19 +2198,19 @@ void DerivationGoal::startBuilder() if (!string2Int(readLine(builderOut.readSide.get()), tmp)) abort(); pid = tmp; - /* Set the UID/GID mapping of the builder's user - namespace such that root maps to the build user, or to the - calling user (if build users are disabled). */ - uid_t targetUid = buildUser.enabled() ? buildUser.getUID() : getuid(); - uid_t targetGid = buildUser.enabled() ? buildUser.getGID() : getgid(); + /* Set the UID/GID mapping of the builder's user namespace + such that the sandbox user maps to the build user, or to + the calling user (if build users are disabled). */ + uid_t hostUid = buildUser.enabled() ? buildUser.getUID() : getuid(); + uid_t hostGid = buildUser.enabled() ? buildUser.getGID() : getgid(); writeFile("/proc/" + std::to_string(pid) + "/uid_map", - (format("0 %d 1") % targetUid).str()); + (format("%d %d 1") % sandboxUid % hostUid).str()); writeFile("/proc/" + std::to_string(pid) + "/setgroups", "deny"); writeFile("/proc/" + std::to_string(pid) + "/gid_map", - (format("0 %d 1") % targetGid).str()); + (format("%d %d 1") % sandboxGid % hostGid).str()); /* Signal the builder that we've updated its user namespace. */ @@ -2457,11 +2420,12 @@ void DerivationGoal::runChild() if (rmdir("real-root") == -1) throw SysError("cannot remove real-root directory"); - /* Become root in the user namespace, which corresponds to - the build user or calling user in the parent namespace. */ - if (setgid(0) == -1) + /* Switch to the sandbox uid/gid in the user namespace, + which corresponds to the build user or calling user in + the parent namespace. */ + if (setgid(sandboxGid) == -1) throw SysError("setgid failed"); - if (setuid(0) == -1) + if (setuid(sandboxUid) == -1) throw SysError("setuid failed"); setUser = false; -- cgit v1.2.3