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authorAlois Wohlschlager <alois1@gmx-topmail.de>2024-05-08 19:15:00 +0200
committeralois31 <alois1@gmx-topmail.de>2024-05-24 21:19:29 +0000
commitf047e4357b4f7ad66c2e476506bf35cab82e441e (patch)
treefcfc0bd4776ca73e19f5125aa9d7f778fc8b3fc7 /src/libstore/globals.hh
parent19ea351642d48a49a2b41248cbbc4569aa16c0a9 (diff)
libstore/build: always enable seccomp filtering and no-new-privileges
Seccomp filtering and the no-new-privileges functionality improve the security of the sandbox, and have been enabled by default for a long time. In https://git.lix.systems/lix-project/lix/issues/265 it was decided that they should be enabled unconditionally. Accordingly, remove the allow-new-privileges (which had weird behavior anyway) and filter-syscall settings, and force the security features on. Syscall filtering can still be enabled at build time to support building on architectures libseccomp doesn't support. Change-Id: Iedbfa18d720ae557dee07a24f69b2520f30119cb
Diffstat (limited to 'src/libstore/globals.hh')
-rw-r--r--src/libstore/globals.hh23
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/src/libstore/globals.hh b/src/libstore/globals.hh
index 8856d8fae..85789f6b5 100644
--- a/src/libstore/globals.hh
+++ b/src/libstore/globals.hh
@@ -912,29 +912,6 @@ public:
)"};
#if __linux__
- Setting<bool> filterSyscalls{
- this, true, "filter-syscalls",
- R"(
- Whether to prevent certain dangerous system calls, such as
- creation of setuid/setgid files or adding ACLs or extended
- attributes. Only disable this if you're aware of the
- security implications.
- )"};
-
- Setting<bool> allowNewPrivileges{
- this, false, "allow-new-privileges",
- R"(
- (Linux-specific.) By default, builders on Linux cannot acquire new
- privileges by calling setuid/setgid programs or programs that have
- file capabilities. For example, programs such as `sudo` or `ping`
- will fail. (Note that in sandbox builds, no such programs are
- available unless you bind-mount them into the sandbox via the
- `sandbox-paths` option.) You can allow the use of such programs by
- enabling this option. This is impure and usually undesirable, but
- may be useful in certain scenarios (e.g. to spin up containers or
- set up userspace network interfaces in tests).
- )"};
-
Setting<StringSet> ignoredAcls{
this, {"security.selinux", "system.nfs4_acl", "security.csm"}, "ignored-acls",
R"(